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Abstract 
Subjective wellbeing data is becoming increasingly popular in economics research. The wellbeing 
valuation approach uses wellbeing data instead of data gleaned from preferences to attach monetary 
values to non-market goods. This method could be an important alternative to preference-based 
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estimates of the value of non-market goods. The paper presents Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation, a 
new approach to valuation using subjective wellbeing data that solves for the main technical problems 
and as a result derives estimates of welfare change and value that are consistent with welfare 
economic theory. As an example, I derive robust values associated with unemployment using the new 
approach and compare these to biased values derived from the standard wellbeing valuation method. 
Values derived from Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation can be used in cost-benefit analysis. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The literature on subjective wellbeing (SWB) within economics is growing fast. Measures 
such as life satisfaction and happiness have increasingly been used as proxies for welfare; as 
complements or even alternatives to preference satisfaction accounts (B. S. Frey, Luechinger, 
& Stutzer, 2009; Bruno S. Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Stutzer & Frey, 2004; Stutzer & Frey, 2003; 
van den Berg & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007). A potentially significant sub-field of this work has 
been the use of measures of SWB to derive monetary values for non-market goods. The 
Wellbeing Valuation (WV) approach uses SWB measures to derive marginal rates of 
substitution (MRS) between a non-market good and income, which can be used to measure 
compensating and equivalent surplus, standard measures of welfare change in and cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). The approach, is an alternative method for valuing goods that does 
not rely on people’s revealed or stated preferences and this is an important development in 
light of the growing evidence from behavioural economics, which suggests that preferences 
may not always be consistent and well-informed, raising questions about their reliability as 
indicators of welfare (see papers in Slovic & Lichtenstein, 2006). 
 
This paper shows that, although a potentially very useful technique, the WV methodology 
applied thus far has provided biased estimates of the value of non-market goods due to a 
number of technical reasons and there are problems surrounding the interpretation of values 
derived using SWB. The main evidence of this has been the consistent finding of very large 
valuation estimates from WV. For example, Clark and Oswald (2002) estimated the cost of 
unemployment to be about £23,000 per month in addition to forgone wage income. 
Generally, we find that values estimated using WV tend to be magnitudes higher than those 
estimated using preference-based techniques (Dolan & Metcalfe, 2008). This has made it all 
but impossible to use this emerging methodology in CBA and public policy in a meaningful 
way. The main technical problems with the current WV methodology are that the statistical 
methods do not generally derive robust causal estimates and that marginal rates of 
substitution cannot be estimated from the single-equation econometric models that are 
employed.  
 
The paper presents a new methodological framework for Wellbeing Valuation that provides 
robust measures of welfare change and monetary value that are consistent with welfare 
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economic theory and that hence can be used in CBA. The major contribution is to move away 
from single-equation models to estimate separate models for income and the non-market 
good, which allows values to be estimated using experimental or observational data or even a 
combination of both. This method is called Three- Stage Wellbeing Valuation and I use it to 
estimate the costs of unemployment as an example. Under Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation 
I find that the compensating surplus for unemployment is about £10,700 per year, or about 
£890 per month. This is a significant improvement on the extremely and implausibly high 
values for unemployment that one would derive using the current methodology and hence the 
new method should improve the standing of wellbeing valuation in academic research and 
policy-making. 
 
The paper is set out as follows. In section 2 we start with a brief recap of the theory of value 
and in section 3 I show how this can be measured with SWB data and discuss the main 
problems associated with the current WV methodology. Section 4 sets out the new approach 
to WV: Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation. I use an example estimating the costs associated 
with unemployment. Finally, sections 5 and 6 provide a discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
2.  The Theory of Value 
 
In welfare economics the theory of value is expressed as the equivalent (ES) or compensating 
surplus (CS) of a good. CS is the amount of money, paid or received, that will leave the agent 
in his initial welfare position following a change in the good. ES is the amount of money, to 
be paid or received, that will leave the agent in his subsequent welfare position in absence of 
a change in the good
1
. This can be translated in terms of willingness to pay (WTP) or accept 
(WTA) as follows: 
  
                                                 
1
 Definitions from Bockstael and McConnell (1980). 
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Table 1. The relationship between ES, CS, WTP and WTA 
 Compensating Surplus (CS) Equivalent Surplus (ES) 
 
Welfare 
gain 
 
WTP for the positive change 
 
 
WTA to forego the positive 
change 
 
 
Welfare 
loss 
 
WTA the negative change 
 
 
WTP to avoid the negative 
change 
 
ES and CS are calculated from the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between money and 
the good. Although Hicks’ pioneering work on the theory of value did not initially use a 
preference satisfaction account of welfare, customarily ES and CS are measured using 
revealed preference (RP) or through stated preference (SP) methods, such as contingent 
valuation. Preference-based valuation methods suffer from problems related to preference 
anomalies and survey biases like protest values, that have been well-documented in the past 
literature and are not discussed further here (see Fujiwara & Campbell, 2011 for detailed 
description of these problems). The WV approach in part has developed off the back of many 
of the critiques surrounding traditional preference methods. By measuring welfare in a 
different manner it has been suggested that many of the problems related to preference-based 
valuation methods can be overcome. 
 
 
3.  Measuring Value Through Wellbeing: The Wellbeing Valuation 
Approach  
 
In the WV approach it is possible to estimate MRS directly since we have an “observable” 
measure of welfare. Here I derive estimators of welfare change with SWB data that are 
consistent with welfare economic theory. We will see that this is different to the theoretical 
approach used in the WV literature, hence why it has produced biased estimates of welfare 
change. Let us use compensating surplus as an example and define CS for a non-market good 
(Q) as: 
 
 (        )   (           )       (1) 
 
4 
 
where  ( ) is the indirect utility function,  is income and   are prices. Superscripts 0 and 1 
respectively signify conditions before and after provision of the good  , which here is 
assumed to affect prices and have a positive impact on utility. The main issue is that in non-
market valuation we are interested in quantifying all of the changes in human welfare that 
accrue from a change in the provision of the good – what Bateman and his colleagues have 
called total economic value (TEV) (Pearce, Ozdemiroglu, & al., 2002). This means that we 
are interested in both the direct and indirect impacts of   on welfare – for example, for an 
environmental programme that protects a large forest area, this would include the direct 
enjoyment I get out of using the area, any health or other benefits I may derive indirectly due 
to carbon dioxide sequestration. 
 
In the WV approach we estimate the elements of equation (1) empirically by using a direct 
‘observable’ measure of utility:  
 
 (     )          (2) 
 
where   is a vector of other determinants of welfare ( ). And this measure of utility is 
subjective wellbeing, such that: 
 
   (     )         (3) 
 
where     is some metric of wellbeing such as life satisfaction and we assume      . 
We recognise possible relationships between   and the other variables in (3) so that the TEV 
of   can be estimated. Using (3) instead of the indirect utility function in (1) and solving for 
CS we get: 
 
   (     )  
         ( 
    )
     
  
     ( 
    )
     
    (4) 
 
In words this states that: Compensating Surplus = (impact of   on ) 
+ (the MRS between income and the indirect effect of   on SWB via  ) 
+ (the MRS between income and the direct effect of   on SWB).  
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Naturally we must also acknowledge that   may impact on SWB indirectly in (4) and so 
      should represent the total derivative for income. Indeed, the CS for a change in the 
non-market good (  ) can be reformulated in terms of total derivatives: 
 
    
  
     
  
   
     
  
⁄         (5) 
 
Equation (5) will estimate the TEV of   in line with welfare economic theory. 
Two further conditions are that (a) the total derivatives in (5) must come from the same 
population group so that they are comparable. I will call this issue sample matching. Second, 
     
  
  should have a clear interpretation where there are heterogenous treatment effects, so 
that results are useful for policy.  
 
When interpreting the results from WV, we should recognise that preference and mental state 
(ie, SWB) accounts of welfare differ markedly and hence there is no reason to believe that 
values derived from WV will or should (in a normative sense) align with neatly values from 
SP and RP methods. Furthermore, there some differences in the interpretation of the values. 
In WV we are not equating SWB with preferences: we are equating SWB with the notion of 
welfare. It is out of the scope of this paper to fully discuss the philosophical differences 
between these different accounts of welfare, but we should note that unless people satisfy 
preferences with the sole purpose of maximising life satisfaction (or whatever measure we 
use in the WV approach), then WV values and preference values will not align. In sum, 
values derived using WV should not be seen as WTP or WTA amounts. Instead, they are 
alternative measures of CS and ES as set out in welfare economic theory. The literature to 
date has tended to use the term ‘income compensation’ to label the values derived from WV. 
This is misleading because it relates strongly to the idea of WTA and that actual 
compensation could be made. Instead, I propose the term ‘monetary equivalent value’ for the 
values derived from WV (regardless of whether they are CS or ES). 
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3.1  The Wellbeing Valuation approach: methodology to date and associated problems 
The WV approach is an emerging method with approximately 60 publications over the last 
decade. The previous literature has taken the following approach: equation (3) is estimated 
empirically using the following type of single-equation model: 
 
                 (  )               (6) 
 
where income is in logarithmic format. Life satisfaction has been the predominant measure of 
SWB used in these models. It takes responses from a question of the type: “How disatisfied 
or satisfied are you with your life overall?”, measured on a scale of 1 to 7 or 1 to 10 etc. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have shown that it makes little difference whether we 
assume cardinality or ordinality in the life satisfaction variable and hence (7) is usually run 
assuming cardinality using ordinary least squares (OLS). In this paper for consistency I also 
focus on life satisfaction
2
, but other measures of wellbeing can easily be used in the general 
framework presented here.  Partial derivatives from the single equation model in (7) are used 
to estimate the value (here CS) of   as: 
 
       
[  (  )  
  ( 
    )
  
]
        (7) 
 
This approach, however, leads to biased estimates of CS and ES for  . There are three main 
technical problems that I shall focus on here, some of which have been discussed in the 
literature elsewhere (eg, Welsch and Kuhling, 2009; Fujiwara and Campbell, 2011).  
 
(i) Parametric restrictions  
If we adjust equation (5) to account for a logarithmic format for income, we see that equation 
(7) does not estimate the correct measure of welfare change (here CS): 
 
        
[  (  )  
     
  
 (     )
     
  
]
      [  ( 
 )  
  ( 
    )
  
]     (8) 
 
                                                 
2
 The WV approach has also been called the life satisfaction approach in the literature. 
7 
 
Since 
     
  
    and 
     
  
    due to the parametric restrictions in the single-equation 
framework (7). We cannot estimate the TEV of   with (7). We can also stipulate that is likely 
that 
     
  
   , forcing up monetary equivalent values in (7), which is a common finding 
and criticism in the WV literature (B. S. Frey, et al., 2009) (see Clark & Oswald, 2002 for 
examples of high value estimates; Nattavudh Powdthavee, 2008). WV values have often been 
found to be magnitudes higher than values derived from RP and SP methods for 
environmental goods (Levinson,(2012); Luechinger (2009)). Furthermore, the relationships 
between the explanatory variables in (6) result in multicollinearity leading to inflated 
standard errors invalidating statistical inference. CS and ES should not be estimated using 
single-equation models. 
  
(ii) Bias 
To estimate welfare changes in equation (5) the total derivatives must have a causal 
attribution. In the wellbeing literature it is well-known that bias can arise from endogeneity, 
simultaneity and measurement error (Pischke, 2010). OLS is the predominant estimator used 
in WV, but it is likely to produce biased causal estimates. Some studies have instead used 
fixed effects models or instrumental variables (IV), but these approaches are still problematic. 
The fixed effects approach cannot control for time-varying unobservable factors and there is 
still the possibility of simultaneity bias and measurement error. In fact, fixed effects can 
exacerbate problems by increasing the ratio of measurement error to actual variation in 
variables that are measured with error (Deaton, 1993).  As for IV techniques, a number of 
papers instrument for income and some for both income and the non-market good in two 
stage least squares (2SLS) (eg, Luechinger (2009) for air quality). But this does not provide a 
solution. First, the theoretical arguments behind income instruments in these papers tend to 
be weak. Commonly used instruments in WV include spouse’s income, spouse’s employment 
status and house ownership, predicted industry wage levels and social class (Ferreira & 
Moro, 2009; Luechinger, 2009; Luttmer, 2005; Pischke, 2010), which are unlikely to be 
independent of the potential treatment (here income) and life satisfaction: none are true 
exogenous shocks to income. Other studies in the wider wellbeing literature have used as 
instruments sight of payslips (N. Powdthavee, 2010) and father’s years of education (Knight, 
Song, & Gunatilaka, 2009), again with concerns about adherence to exogeneity and exclusion 
restriction assumptions. Lottery wins have been used as IVs for income, but lottery wins have 
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not been employed to estimate monetary values and as I shall argue below the ignorability 
assumptions have not been fully met in the lottery wins literature to date.  
 
Second, using 2SLS in a single-equation framework (even with perfect instruments) cannot 
provide the correct solution: when more than one variable is instrumented in the same model 
(as in Luechinger (2009)) it is nearly always impossible to derive the total derivatives that we 
need to estimate ES and CS. To explain this, assume an optimal situation where robust 
random IVs exist for   and  . If   and   are correlated, then one of them has to be 
measured before the other in order to avoid the problem of indirect effects: we can only 
include    and      (both instrumented) or vice versa in 2SLS. This means we cannot 
estimate a total derivative for the variable that is set at time    . This problem is further 
exacerbated when other controls are required in 2SLS for identification. 
 
(iii)  Undefined sample populations 
Finally, there is the question of to whom the estimates apply and the issue of sample 
matching. A large majority of papers focus on a binary  , for example, being employed, 
being healthy, living in a safe or polluted area etc, and I shall focus the discussion here on 
binary variables for  . The issue of sample matching becomes problematic when we 
acknowledge heterogenous treatment effects. When using 2SLS causal estimates for   and  
may be coming from two different unobservable complier sub-populations, making sample 
matching impossible - further reason to avoid using 2SLS in WV. On the other hand, if OLS 
is used it provides poorly-defined estimators for   and  , that lie somewhere between the 
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect for the non-
treated (ATNT) (Humphreys, 2009), which are different population groups.  The samples 
used in the numerator and denominator in (5) should be the same (or come form the same 
population) and 
     
  
 should have a clear treatment effect interpretation so that we can make 
meaningful policy conclusions. For example, if 
     
  
 were estimated as the ATT, the 
monetary equivalent value would represent the retrospective value of   (the policy) for those 
that were treated. The ATNT would tell us something about how valuable it would be if the 
policy were rolled out to those who were not initially treated (ie, the prospective value of the 
policy) and the ATE would give us a broad estimate of value for anyone picked from the 
general population. 
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4.  New Approach to Wellbeing Valuation 
 
In light of the above issues, the wellbeing model is clearly better explained and understood as 
a set of simultaneous equations in which SWB and the explanatory variables may be jointly 
determined and may interact with each other. The general approaches to estimating 
simultaneous equation models (SEM) are to use IV techniques or full-model maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) (Kline, 2005). Estimation through MLE requires a-priori 
knowledge of the relationships between all variables and the nature of the error terms and of 
course without exogenous variation in the explanatory variables we are unable to attribute 
causality – we still rely on a selection on observables story for identification. For IV 
estimation we have already discussed the associated problems in these circumstances. 
 
The model developed here will be as flexible (and realistic) as possible - allowing for 
selection on unobservables and on unobservable gains and to provide estimates of welfare 
change that are relevant for policy. The main criteria will be for an approach that: (a) derives 
causal estimates for the impact of income and the good  ; (b) is non-parametric (or 
minimally parametric) so that indirect effects of   and   can be acknowledged in order to 
derive total impacts on SWB and the TEV; and (c) derives well-defined causal estimates for a 
matched sample group. 
 
Given the SEM framework, the solution I propose is to non-parametrically estimate the full 
wellbeing model in two separate stages; one stage for the income variable and the other for 
the   variable of interest. In each stage exogenous changes in income and the non-market 
good should be employed, which means that we can estimate causal total derivatives for   
and   with well-defined treatment effects for  . The models in these two stages should be 
estimated for the same sample population and from this the MRS between   and   can be 
derived in the final stage of the process. This is what I shall call the Three-Stage Wellbeing 
Valuation Approach (3S-WV).  
 
4.1. Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation 
The basis of the 3S-WV approach is to estimate the following three equations: 
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STAGE 1. Income Model:       (   (  ))                                       (9) 
STAGE 2. Non-Market Good Model:       (  )     (10)  
STAGE 3. Monetary Equivalent Value: Calculate      using     and      
 
where, (i)     has a well-defined treatment effect; (ii)     and     are causal total derivatives 
(    
     
  
 and     
     
  
 ); and (iii)   is drawn from the same sub-population, hence 3S-
WV will provide measures of CS and ES that are consistent with welfare economic theory as 
set out in (5). Equations (9) and (10) in effect internalise the system of simultaneous 
equations that make up the wellbeing model. The key point to note about 3S-WV is that it 
accommodates a variety of statistical methods - any mix of experimental and non-
experimental techniques can be used to estimate the three stages, provided that the three 
modelling criteria are adhered to. Ideally (9) and (10) would be estimated in studies where 
treatment assignment has been randomised, but it would be possible to use other methods that 
are capable of deriving robust causal estimates under the right conditions, such as 
instrumental variables, difference-in-difference methods and regression discontinuity design. 
Indeed if a selection on observables assumption is appropriate, we could employ a matching 
estimator or OLS controlling only for pre-treatment covariates.  
 
Table 2 provides the framework for estimating ES and CS in 3S-WV, where log of income is 
used in (9) to reflect diminishing marginal utility of income (for continuous   variables it 
would also be possible to use formats to reflect non-linear marginal impacts on SWB).  
 
Table 2. CS and ES in wellbeing valuation  
 Compensating Surplus (CS) Equivalent Surplus (ES) 
 
Welfare 
gain 
 
       
[  (  )  
   
   
]
 
 
    
[
   
   
     (  )]
    
 
 
Welfare 
loss 
 
    
[
    
   
     (  )]
    
 
 
 
       
[  (  )  
   
   
]
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It is important to note that under this framework CS for welfare gains and ES for welfare 
losses are constrained at the level of an individual's income, whereas ES for welfare gains 
and CS for welfare losses have their limits at infinity as we would expect (Johansson, 1987). 
To see this, for example, take ES for a welfare loss. Here     is negative and for   with very 
large negative impacts, such that       : 
 
       
[  (  )  
   
   
]
                 (11) 
 
For a given   differences between ES and CS will emerge in this framework due to the 
curvature of the income function. For welfare gains, ES > CS. For welfare losses, CS > ES. 
The phenomenon of loss aversion that has been suggested to lead to the WTP-WTA disparity 
for a given good would come through in this framework if a given non-market good had a 
bigger absolute impact on SWB when it was taken away than when it was given to the 
individual. 
 
4.2.  Estimation in Three-Stage Wellbeing Valuation 
We have noted that the 3S-WV model can be estimated with experimental and observational 
data. The ‘gold standard’ here would be to estimate     and     from two separate studies 
where treatment (  and ) are randomised. Assuming that the standard assumptions are met 
randomised trials (RCTs)
3
 provide unbiased causal estimates with well-defined treatment 
effects – the ATE and ATT. Further, the non-parametric difference in means estimate from an 
RCT is the total derivative. We note that if (9) and (10) are estimated from the same sample, 
rather than from two non-overlapping random samples of the same population, it is likely that 
SWB outcomes will not be independent across   and hence bootstrap standard errors should 
be used for inference. 
 
The main problem for this ‘gold standard’ approach is that at a practical level, in 
policymaking random assignment may not always be possible and it is unlikely that we will 
be able to randomise income in large samples due to financial, political and ethical 
constraints. This is problematic because of the central role that income plays in the WV 
approach. It turns out, therefore, that the income model (equation (9)) will need to be 
estimated using non-experimental data and then matched to estimates of     from equation 
                                                 
3
 I use the term ‘RCT’ to include any study where treatment has been randomised, such as field experiments. 
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(10). In this paper I use lottery wins as an instrumental variable for income and derive causal 
estimates of the total derivative (
     
  
) using minimal parametric restrictions. I employ a 
control function approach, instead of traditional 2SLS, in order to derive a treatment effect of 
income for a clearly defined sample population, rather than the unobservable complier subset 
(the approach set out here is to use an IV for income, but any other method that is able to 
derive causal estimates for income in (9) can be used instead). It is possible, then, to match 
this estimate of     with an estimate of     that has a robust causal interpretation.  
 
In this paper, as an example, I will derive the compensating and equivalent surplus for 
unemployment over and above the impact of loss of wage income using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In other words this will be the monetary equivalent value 
of the non-financial costs associated with unemployment. The income model is estimated 
using the CF approach and a natural experiment is used in the non-market good 
(unemployment) model (10). I derive the average partial effect (APE) for income, which will 
be relevant to the general population rather than an unidentified complier sub-group, which 
means that we can ensure sample matching. Because of its generality, the APE income 
estimate can actually be used as an ‘off-the-shelf’ estimate of the income model (9) in other 
WV studies; it would be possible to use the causal estimate of income derived here for all 
subsequent WV studies that use the BHPS or another dataset that is representative of the UK. 
The     parameter will also be derived as the average effect for the same sample – it will be 
the ATE for unemployment (this is a non-market ‘bad’, but I shall call it a treatment in order 
to refer back to the treatment effects literature). The monetary equivalent value derived here 
has a clear interpretation; it is the cost of unemployment for a randomly selected person from 
the UK population.  
 
4.2.1.  STAGE 1: The income model 
The income variable is likely to suffer from simultaneity and endogeneity bias and 
measurement error. The clearest exogenous changes in income we will be able to find in 
national surveys are most likely to come from lottery wins and a small literature uses lottery 
wins to identify causal effects of income on wellbeing and health. Apouey and Clark (2009) 
and Gardner and Oswald (2007) use lottery wins themselves from the BHPS as an 
explanatory variable and they find positive impacts on health and wellbeing. Lindahl (2005 
uses data on Swedish lottery winners in 2SLS and finds positive impacts on health. The main 
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caveat to these studies is that data in the BHPS and from Sweden only provides information 
on the size of annual lottery wins. We do not know how often people play and so annual 
lottery wins are not strictly exogenous: people who play more are more likely to win more 
money and this is problematic as those who play more are also likely to have different levels 
of potential income to start off with. Lindahl (2005) and Apouey and Clark (2009) show that 
annual lottery wins in both datasets are correlated with a host of socioeconomic variables and 
this is why all of the papers hold these variables constant in an attempt to ensure exogeneity 
in the lottery prize variable. However, the fact that these variables are determinants of win 
size means that there are also likely to be a host of other unobservable variables that are 
correlated with win size and income and which we cannot control for. Hence, only 
controlling for some of the observable characteristics that determine winnings per year is 
unlikely to produce unbiased casual estimates for income. A second problem is that the 
localised complier-relevant estimates from 2SLS are too narrow for use in WV and we do not 
know the populations to whom the estimates can be generalised. 
 
A different approach is taken here with the lottery wins data from the BHPS. Firstly, I 
hypothesise that the amount of previous lottery wins will capture lottery playing preferences 
and hence current playing frequency much more accurately than observable socioeconomic 
factors - on the assumption that people who play a lot in the past will always tend to play a 
lot, unless they win very large amounts, but these people are excluded from the analysis. I 
find that controlling for previous wins leaves all other observable background variables 
statistically insignificant in determining annual lottery win size (see Table 4) - evidence that 
controlling for previous wins will ensure exogeneity in the lottery wins instrument, arguably 
something that was not achieved in the previous literature.  
 
The second difference is that I use a control function (CF) approach instead of 2SLS. As 
discussed, 2SLS derives local average effects for an undefined complier sub-group, which 
makes it impossible to sample match in WV. Under some additional assumptions (to standard 
2SLS), the CF approach will allow us to derive estimates of the sample average partial effect 
(APE) for income, which is a clear treatment effect for a well-defined sample group. The CF 
approach is preferred here to other methods in the literature that attempt to extrapolate 
localised IV effects (LATE) to population average effects (see for example, Aronow and 
Sovey (2010), Follmann (2000) and Angrist and Fernandes-Val (2010)). These methods are 
problematic because they assume that sub-group differences in LATEs can be explained 
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solely by observable characteristics and because extrapolation requires knowledge of non-
compliers’ (always-takers and never-takers) treatment effects, for which no counterfactual or 
causal effect exists. The CF approach does not rely on these assumptions. The methodology 
set out here will allow us to get unbiased causal estimates for income for a well-defined 
general population group. 
 
Data and methodology 
Both the income and unemployment model presented here use data from the BHPS, which is 
a nationally representative sample of British households, containing over 10,000 adults, 
conducted every year since 1991. Life satisfaction (measured on a scale of 1 – 7) was added 
in 1997 and so we analyse the period 1997- 2009, excluding 2001 which did not include life 
satisfaction questions. The BHPS asks respondents whether they have won money on 
lotteries or football pools and how much they have won in total during the year. In the UK 
there are a large number of lottery players (Wardle, 2010) and these swamp the football pool 
players in the BHPS dataset (Gardner & Oswald, 2007). I will therefore refer to this group 
simply as lottery winners as Gardner and Oswald (2007) do. Table 3 shows the descriptions 
for all variables used in this paper. Since I run a number of models I do not provide 
descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the variables as they will differ for 
each model (due to different samples), but they can be obtained from the author if required. 
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Table 3. Variable descriptions  
Variables Descriptions 
Life satisfaction 
 
 
Job satisfaction 
Life satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point 
scale so that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely 
satisfied 
Job satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point 
scale so that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely 
satisfied 
 
Household income 
Household size 
House ownership 
Annual equivalised gross household income 
Number of people living in the home 
= 1 if respondents owns their home 
Unemployed 
Spouse employed 
Redundant unemployed 
 
Retired 
Job hours 
Male 
= 1 if not employed or self-employed 
= 1 if spouse is employed or self-employed 
= 1 if respondent was made redundant (and is still 
unemployed)  
= 1 if retired 
Hours worked per week 
= 1 if male 
Age Age of respondent 
Low education =1 if left education after minimum compulsory 
Poor health 
 
Carer 
Previous lottery wins 
Lottery win 
 
No. of children 
= 1 if respondent assesses own health as 'poor' 
or ' very poor' 
= 1 if respondent provides care of others 
Sum of previous lottery wins (£) 
= 1 if respondent won between £100 - £50,000 in 
lotteries over the year 
Number of children under age 16 in the 
household 
Married = 1 if married) 
Divorced = 1 if divorced 
Widowed = 1if widowed 
Separated = 1 if separated  
Never married = 1 if never married 
Winter interview = 1 if survey was taken in winter 
Living in safe area = 1 if respondent does not live in an area where 
they perceive vandalism and crime to be a 
problem. 
Debt burden = 1 if repayment of debt and associated interest is 
a 'heavy burden' or 'somewhat of a burden' 
 
I use the CF approach to run a correlated random coefficient (CRC) model using lottery wins 
as an IV ( ) for household income and controlling for previous lottery wins. For previous 
wins, I sum annual lottery wins over all years in which the respondent was present in the data 
up to    . Following Heckman and Vytlacil (ref 1998) the model is set up as follows 
(dropping the time and individual subscripts for simplicity): 
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         ( )               (12) 
 
                    (13) 
 
   ( )                  (14) 
 
so that,  
 
         ( )           ( )           (15) 
 
where    is unobserved heterogeneity that interacts with income and  (  ) is the sample 
APE for income. Since   is endogenous in (12),   and    are correlated, and under the 
assumption of heterogenous treatment effects    and    are also correlated. Therefore,    and 
  in (15) are estimable from the error term in (14):  (  |   )        ( |   )      . 
Equation (15) then becomes: 
      
         ( )         ̂    ( )     ̂       (16) 
 
where  ̂  is the predicted error terms from (14). The assumptions underlying the CRC model 
are somewhat more restrictive than those for 2SLS. In addition to the standard assumptions 
for valid instruments, we assume here that (14) is linear and that  ( |  )  and  (  |  ) 
(respectively unobserved self-selection and unobserved selection on gains) are linear 
functions. Also, we note that the composite error term in (15) (ie,      ( )   ) has a non-
zero heterosckedastic mean and so robust standard errors are used. Under these assumptions 
   in (16) represents the causal effect of log of household income on life satisfaction for the 
average person in the sample. It is noted that we do not require the monotonicity assumption 
in this set-up because we can assume that we have one-sided non-compliance to the 
instrument – in other words, it is reasonable to assume that the subject pool comprises of 
compliers and always-takers. Never-takers would be people that do not cash in on winning 
lottery tickets, which seems unlikely. Table 4 shows that controlling for previous lottery wins 
ensures exogeneity in  .  
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Table 4. Determinants of annual lottery wins size 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient 
S.E. 
low education 136.903 117.398 
age -2.066 -3.457 
male 129.526 112.586 
poor Health -154.732 -200.634 
unemployed -98.941 -446.597 
no. of children 81.733 70.75 
lagged income -0.001 -0.002 
previous lottery wins 0.07*** 0.014 
constant 249.086 228.99 
Observations 5,269   
 
Therefore we use a conditional independence assumption :  
 
(           )    |                    (17) 
 
where in this case   is life satisfaction, the “treatment” ( ) is an increase in income and   is 
lottery wins. This implies that (conditional on previous win amounts) lottery wins cannot be 
correlated with other determinants of household income (exogeneity) and that lottery wins 
can only affect life satisfaction through the impact on income (exclusion restriction). Note 
here that previous wins is a pre-treatment variable so income can still have indirect effects on 
wellbeing and hence    = 
     
  
.  It should be noted that the estimation procedure set out here 
still has some parametric restrictions in that the impact of income on wellbeing is assumed to 
take a logarithmic format, but there is evidence to support this (Layard, Nicholl, & Mayarz, 
2008).  
 
It could be argued that the exclusion restriction could fail here as lottery winners may also be 
happier because of euphoria experienced at winning the lottery. Therefore, the present paper 
compares lottery winners of different amounts as in Gardner and Oswald (2007) and Imbens 
et al. (2001).     for people with (small) annual wins of under £100 and     for people 
with medium sized annual wins of £100 to £50,000. Wins are restricted to a maximum of 
£50,000 since sample sizes get very low after this point, which makes extrapolation shaky. 
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Here both groups are winners and will feel some happiness due to having won. Is there still a 
problem that larger winners (the     group) may feel more euphoria than smaller winners 
(the     group)? This is will be undoubtedly true, but it suggests that the level of euphoria 
experienced at winning the lottery is correlated with win size, which suggests that it is the 
money prize that causes happiness; precisely the effect we are interested in for the 
instrument. Second, the euphoria felt from the act of winning itself may only be temporary 
anyway and not picked up in the life satisfaction responses at the time of the survey.  
 
Comparing the sample of small to medium-sized lottery winners has implications for our 
interpretation of the APE. The CF will derive the causal effect of income for the average 
lottery player. This means that for valuation we would have to either estimate     for the 
average lottery player in the UK or find a way of converting the APE for lottery players to the 
general population APE. The latter is preferable and since the evidence suggests that a large 
proportion of the UK population (over 70%) play lotteries we will assume here that the 
sample APE from the CF is equivalent to the population APE and we can match this with the 
population average estimate of    . 
 
Results 
Table 5 presents the results of the CF model for income. The first stage is equation (14). I 
find that winning the lottery has a highly significant positive effect on household income 
after controlling for previous win amounts. In the control function the sample APE of log of 
household income on life satisfaction is 1.1, which is also highly significant. This represents 
the causal effect of income on life satisfaction for any lottery player chosen at random, which 
we can assume to represent the average effect for the UK population. No post-treatment 
variables are included in the model and hence this is the full causal effect (the total 
derivative) of household income on life satisfaction: 
 
     
  
                 (18) 
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Table 5. The causal effect of income on life satisfaction 
 
First stage regression (equation (14)) 
Dependent variable: log(household income) 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. 
lottery win 0.102*** 0.015 
previous lottery wins 6.82e-06*** 0.000 
constant 9.999*** 0.007 
Observations 10,461   
 
Control Function (equation (16)) 
Dependent variable: life satisfaction 
Independent 
variables Coefficient S.E. 
log (household income) 1.103*** 0.252 
previous lottery wins -0.00001*** -0.000 
  ̂  -1.108*** -0.260 
  ̂    ( ) 0.011* 0.006 
constant -5.777** -2.530 
Observations 10,328   
 
We note that  ̂  is significant which is proof that the income variable is endogenous in the 
life satisfaction equation and is likely that standard OLS would generate biased estimates of 
the causal effect of income. The coefficient is negative implying that in cases where income 
is not exogenously determined we will see downward bias in the income coefficient. As we 
shall see below, OLS estimates of the impact of income are magnitudes lower than the casual 
effect estimated in Table 5. The interactive term ( ̂    ( )) is significant at the 10% level, 
showing some evidence for heterogenous impacts of income. 
 
4.2.2.  STAGE 2: The non-market good model (unemployment)  
I use involuntary redundancy to estimate the causal effect of unemployment on life 
satisfaction. It turns out that the involuntary redundancy variable in the BHPS can be seen as 
naturally occurring or exogenous to life satisfaction. Table 6 shows evidence that redundancy 
decisions seem to be ‘as good as randomly assigned’ in the BHPS because a range of pre-
redundancy variables are balanced between the redundant and employed groups (see columns 
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(i) – (iii)). Columns (iv) – (vi) show that this is not the case when comparing the sample of 
general unemployed with the employed. Although there is likely to be some ‘selection’ into 
redundancy by those who are less productive, less motivated, in poor health and with caring 
duties etc, the manner in which the job termination question in the BHPS is asked seems to 
solve this issue for us because in the question itself people can state that they terminated their 
last job because of health reasons, caring duties or because they were sacked and so on.  
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Table 6: Balance of covariates across unemployed and employed 
Variable 
(measured pre-
unemployment) 
(i) 
Redundant 
unemployed 
(ii) 
 
Employed 
(iii) 
 
Difference 
(iv) 
General 
unemployed 
(v) 
 
Employed 
(vi) 
 
Difference 
Life satisfaction 5.05 5.1 0.05       
(p=0.70) 
4.8 5.13 0.33*** 
(p=0.0) 
Job satisfaction 3.97 3.78 0.19                   
(p=0.41) 
2.91 3.88 0.97***       
(p=0.0) 
Labour income £11,400 £11,008 £392     
(p=0.82) 
£6,760 £11,494 £4734***         
(p=0.0) 
Job hours 34.35 34.19 0.16         
(p=0.9) 
33.29 34.26 0.98       
(p=0.11) 
Health (annual 
no. of visits to 
GP) 
2.19 2.29 0.19        
(p=0.34) 
2.34 2.28 0.06 
(p=0.12) 
Carer 4.42% 3.24% 1.2         
(p=0.48) 
4.09% 3.17% 0.9      
(p=0.2) 
Married 45.70% 43% 2.7         
(p=0.21) 
22.20% 45.50% 23***       
(p=0.0) 
House owned 66.40% 68.40% 20          
(p=0.64) 
51.70% 70.30% 18.6*** 
(p=0.0) 
Household size 3.1 3.1 0.09         
(p=0.13) 
3.28 3.08 0.20*** 
(p=0.0) 
Debt burden 20.40% 17.40% 3            
(p=0.40) 
17.80% 17.40% 0.4    
(p=0.77) 
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Consequently, and as we would expect, the unemployment variable (redundant unemployed) 
is highly robust to the inclusion of other important covariates in regression analysis in Table 
7: the coefficient staying constant at -0.44. 
 
Table 7: The causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
  Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Redundant unemployed -0.441*** -0.065 -0.436*** -0.062 
Log (household income) 0.164*** 0.012 0.092*** 0.013 
Retired     0.209*** 0.048 
Poor health     -0.150*** -0.008 
Age      -0.067*** -0.005 
Age^2     0.001*** 0.000 
Married     0.086*** 0.023 
Divorced     -0.243*** -0.050 
Widowed     -0.283*** -0.085 
Separated     -0.464*** -0.070 
Never married     -0.242*** -0.033 
Carer     -0.113** -0.046 
Low education     0.023 0.016 
Wales     -0.008 -0.024 
Scotland     -0.017 -0.021 
N. Ireland     0.178*** 0.031 
Live in safe area     0.153*** 0.021 
Debt burden     -0.315*** -0.022 
Winter interview     -0.004 -0.018 
House owned     0.099*** 0.019 
Spouse employed     0.124*** 0.026 
Number of children     -0.007 -0.010 
Year     -0.004* -0.002 
Constant 3.549*** (0.120) 5.735*** 0.146 
Observations 24,411   24,395   
R-Squared 0.011   0.078   
 
In these models, income is held constant so that we can measure the non-financial impacts of 
unemployment on life satisfaction. Since causal identification does not rely on conditioning 
on other variables we can drop all other covariates here and use the model in column (1) of 
Table 7 so that we avoid the indirect effects problem. Furthermore, we are able to derive a 
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well-defined treatment effect. We interpret the result from this model as showing that being 
unemployed causally reduces life satisfaction (over and above the impact on wage income) 
by 0.44 points for the average person in the sample, which is representative of the UK (it is 
the sample average effect of unemployment).  This estimate includes all channels through 
which unemployment impacts on life satisfaction, such as through worse health: 
 
     
  
                 (19) 
 
This is the impact for the first year in unemployment and it includes the impact of entry into 
unemployment and the state of being unemployed for that first year.  
 
4.2.3.  STAGE 3: The monetary equivalent cost of unemployment  
Using equations from Table 2 and results from Tables 5 and 7, we derive the CS and ES of 
unemployment (we use a sample median income of £23,000): 
 
Compensating surplus for unemployment 
    
[
    
   
     (  )]
     
[
    
      
(      )]
                          
 
This is the amount of extra annual household income that would be required in order to keep 
a randomly chosen employed person just as satisfied with life if he were made unemployed 
(after controlling for loss of wage income).  
 
Equivalent surplus for unemployment: 
       
[  (  )  
   
   
]
         [  
(      )  
    
   ]                  
 
This is the amount of money one would need to take away from a randomly selected 
individual in employment to reduce his life satisfaction to the levels he would experience if 
he were unemployed (after controlling for loss of wage income).  
 
These are unbiased estimates of CS and ES for unemployment, with a clear interpretation for 
policy purposes. As expected CS is larger than ES and arguably CS is the preferred measure 
as it is the commonly used measure in non-market valuation. To show the level of bias one 
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would confront using standard WV methods in Table 8 I show coefficients for log of 
household income (un-instrumented) and for unemployment status (where the unemployed 
are the whole sample of unemployed people) from a pooled OLS model. I include all 
variables from column 2 of Table 7 except for spouse employment status since it is not 
usually included in WV studies and number of children as it was highly insignificant. This is 
a typical type of model used in the WV literature and as discussed it will usually lead to 
biased estimates. 
 
Table 8: Pooled-OLS life satisfaction model 
Independent variables Coefficient S.E. 
Unemployed -0.51*** -0.031 
Log (household income) 0.08*** 0.012 
Observations 24,395   
R-squared 0.088   
 
Compared to our causal estimate of unemployment, we see that the standard OLS model 
produces an over-bias in the coefficient on unemployment. This seems intuitively right as we 
would expect certain individuals to be more likely to become unemployed and be less 
satisfied with life anyway. The bias in the income coefficient is much more severe. The 
causal estimate derived from lottery winners is more than ten times larger than the OLS 
estimate. This direction of change is expected given that instrumenting for income generally 
tends to result in an increase in coefficient size (Pischke, 2010). The income coefficient may 
have increased using the lottery instrument because (a) people who would be happy anyway 
tend to earn less money, (b) income is measured with error and (c) many of the indirect 
effects of income are controlled for in OLS.  
 
For the pooled-OLS model CS for unemployment is about £13m per year and ES is £22,959 
per year. These values are clearly implausibly too high due to the severe biases, reflecting 
many of the findings from the previous WV literature. We also note that the values derived 
from the pooled-OLS model do not have properly defined treatment effects and hence we 
cannot attribute them to a relevant population group. In sum, this shows that the traditional 
single-equation methods should not be used to value non-market goods in wellbeing 
valuation. 
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5.  Discussion 
 
We have used the 3S-WV approach to derive robust values associated with employment. This 
was based on models that use exogenous changes in income and in employment status. The 
estimate for the causal effect of income (   ) is generic enough to be used elsewhere. The 
Appendix provides a quick-reference table to show the predicted values for different 
hypothetical impacts sizes of   on life satisfaction using the estimate of     from this paper. 
 
It is possible to run 3S-WV with models that do not utilise exogenous changes in the 
variables of interest, but it should be stressed that outside of the case of perfectly observable 
eligibility as in the RDD case, standard selection on observables methods - such as matching 
and OLS - should be seen as second-best options for 3S-WV, only to be considered when (i) 
random assignment of the non-market good ( ) is not possible, (ii) study designs that allow 
for selection on unobservables are not available and (iii) the selection on observables 
assumption is realistic.  
 
In this paper we have not covered some of the other technical issues that have been 
highlighted in the literature, including the implications of relative income effects and 
adaptation for the WV approach. It was out of the scope of this paper to include these issues 
since arguably they are less severe and less complicated and their implications relate to 
interpretation of the results rather than to any bias. However, these are issues we should look 
at going forward. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Non-market good valuation is central to CBA and policy evaluation. Wellbeing valuation is a 
recently developed approach and the problem is that the current methodology produces 
significantly biased estimates of compensating and equivalent surplus for non-market goods, 
which are not useful for policy. The 3S-WV approach solves for the main technical problems 
and provides estimates of compensating and equivalent surplus that are consistent with 
economic theory and that have well-defined interpretations for policy-making. 3S-WV can be 
used with both experimental and observational data or a combination of both and in this 
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paper we use 3S-WV to derive unbiased estimates of compensating and equivalent surplus 
for unemployment using observational data. The example used here shows that 3S-WV 
derives much more plausible value estimates for non-market goods than previous methods. 
These valuations are alternatives to values derived using preference-based approaches and are 
now robust for use in CBA and policy-making.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 offers a quick-reference chart of values (CS) for hypothetical impacts sizes based 
on the causal effect of log of income of 1.1 and an average income of £23,000. This gives an 
idea of the values associated with different coefficient sizes for non-market goods or ‘bads’. 
The values are based on life satisfaction models where life satisfaction is measured on a scale 
of 1-7. 
 
Table A1. Monetary equivalent values for hypothetical wellbeing impacts 
Hypothetical 
impact size for 
   
CS for welfare 
gain 
Hypothetical 
impact size for 
   
CS for welfare 
loss 
0.0001 £2 -0.0001 £2 
0.0005 £10 -0.0005 £10 
0.001 £21 -0.001 £21 
0.005 £104 -0.005 £105 
0.01 £208 -0.01 £210 
0.05 £1,022 -0.05 £1,070 
0.1 £1,999 -0.1 £2,189 
0.25 £4,676 -0.25 £5,869 
0.5 £8,401 -0.5 £13,235 
0.75 £11,369 -0.75 £22,482 
1 £13,733 -1 £34,087 
1.5 £17,118 -1.5 £66,939 
2 £19,267 -2 £118,695 
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